Ciclul Dinamic pe Piata Muncii

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Vom arata cum cautarea joburilor si propagarea socurilor in economie sunt corelate (legate). Crescand cautarea angajatilor care au deja un job, intr-un boom, amplifica incurajarea firmelor in oferirea locurilor vacante. Prin pastrarea joburilor la costuri mici pentru firme , in cautarea joburilor este amplificat socul. In baza noastra de masurare acest lucru permite modelului sa aibe fluctuatii ale neangajarii , locuri vacante si productivitatea muncii si lasa outputul sa fie foarte autocorelat. 
Cercetarea inceputa cu Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) si Costain si Reiter (2005) arata ca cautarea si potrivirea modelelor de-a lungul liniilor lui Mortensen si Pissarides (1994) pot explica ciclurile dinamice pe piata muncii numai asumand mari socuri ale productivitatii. Pentru metode de masurare resonabile, regulile standarde pot prezice modificarile de somaj si locuri vacante. Amandoi Hall si Shimer exploreaza rigiditatea salariilor ca o solutie la acest neasjuns. Cu acest element, incurajarea firmelor de a crea noi joburi intr-un boom este pastrata la un nivel inalt avand in vedere ca angajatii nu negociaza salariile. Prin urmare tot mai multe joburi vacante sunt lansate si somajul este in scadere. Acest argument se bazeaza pe faptul ca ratia somajului intra in ecuatia veniturilor (salarii), reflectand optiunile angajatilor. De aceea cand salariile nu sunt rigide dar in mod continuu renegociate , sunt extrem de volatile(schimbatoare).
Vom arata in aceasta lucrare ca "in cautarea jobului" ofera o solutie la aceasta problema. Intr-un boom, crescand gradul de cautare a joburilor de oamenii deja angajati va largii aria potentialilor angajatori pentru firme, in adaugarea celor care cauta neangajarea (somajul). Ca o consecinta, puterea de negociere a oamenilor cu functii si a noilor angajati scade cu mult mai putin decat ar fi implicit din ratia de neangajare standard. Salariile arata o modificare mai mica decat in modelul standard.

We show how on-the-job search and the propagation of shocks to the economy are
intricately linked. Rising search by employed workers in a boom amplifies the incentives
of firms to post vacancies. In turn, more vacancies increases job search. By keeping job
creation costs low for firms, on-the-job search greatly amplifies shocks. In our baseline
calibration, this allows the model to generate fluctuations of unemployment, vacancies,
and labor productivity whose magnitudes are close to the data, and leads output to be
highly autocorrelated.
KEYWORDS: Search and matching, job-to-job mobility, worker flows
Beveridge curve, business cycle, propagation
Part of this research was conducted while the second author was visiting the Department of Economics
at Tilburg University, whose hospitality is gratefully ackowledged. We thank Jan Boone, Winfried Koeniger,
Jan van Ours, and in particular Robert Hussey and James Nason for comments and discussions. Special
thanks go to Eva Nagypal for extensive comments on the 2004 version of this paper which helped improve
the exposition. We also received useful comments from seminar participants at the 2004 Econometric Society
Summer Meetings in Providence, the Society of Computational Economics Conference in Amsterdam, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the EEA/ESEM meetings in Madrid, Deutsche Bundesbank, the SED
2005 meetings in Budapest, and Tilburg University. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Federal Reserve System or the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany. Tel.: +49(0)69 9566-2382. Fax: +49(0)69
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1 Introduction
Research starting with Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005) shows
that the search and matching models along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
can explain the cyclical dynamics of the labor market only by assuming implausibly large
productivity shocks. For reasonable calibrations, the standard framework underpredicts the
volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Both Hall and Shimer explore real wage rigidity
as a solution to this shortcoming. With this element, firms incentives to create new jobs in a
boom are kept high since workers do not share the returns through bargaining. Hence, more
vacancies are posted, and unemployment falls. This argument rests on the fact that the
vacancy-unemployment ratio enters the wage equation, reflecting workers outside options.
Thus, when wages are not rigid, but continuously renegotiated, they are excessively volatile.1
We show in this paper that on-the-job search offers a resolution to this puzzle. In a
boom, rising search activity by employed workers expands the pool of potential hires for
firms, in addition to those searching from unemployment. As a consequence, the bargaining
power of incumbent and newly hired workers rises by much less than would be implied
by the standard vacancy-unemployment ratio. Wages exhibit less volatility than in the
standard model.
To develop this argument, we present a general equilibrium business cycle model with
labor market frictions and search by employed and unemployed workers. Search on the job
is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence of two types of jobs, which differ
in terms of profitability and thus the returns to working. Workers in low-wage (bad) jobs
search in order to gain employment in high-wage (good) jobs. Good job vacancies can be
matched with employed and unemployed job seekers, whereas firms in the bad job sector
only hire unemployed workers. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining for each matched
job-worker unit and continuously renegotiated. We calibrate the model to match salient
long-run features of job and worker flows.
Our model can correctly predict the observed volatility of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. At the same time, the ratio of vacancies to unemployed and employed job seekers
is substantially less volatile, which is key to wage dynamics. Employed workers search
activity responds strongly to a positive aggregate shock to take advantage of the increased
availability of good employment opportunities. Job-to-job flows increase substantially. But
as search on the job rises, and wage increases are muted, the incentive to create vacancies
1Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), Fujita and Ramey (2005), and Rotemberg (2006), among others, explore
alternative mechanisms.
remains high. The corresponding fall in unemployment is large. This is achieved even
though productivity shocks are of plausible magnitude and wages are, a priori, fully flexible.
Moreover, on-the-job search yields a powerful internal propagation mechanism in that small
aggregate impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output and employment.
We show that this propagation is intricately linked with the mechanism that keeps job
creation high.

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